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COMMENT
not yet widely regarded as criminal."3 However,
the existence of injunctive relief along with the
criminal sanctions, establishes the Refuse Act of
1899 as a formidable anti-pollution enactment.
The Refuse Act Permit Program curtails the applicability of the Refuse Act and attempts to link
it to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
by limiting the imposition of the Refuse Act penalties to instances where an industry has failed
to comply with FWPCA-approved water quality
standards and has not received a permit. By relying on water quality standards, the Refuse Act
Permit Program imposes criminal liability without regard to the harm done to the receiving waterway by a particular discharge. This result is contrary to the purpose of the Refuse Act as expressed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Republic
Steel Corp.,"4 and to the national policy of nondegradation as expressed by the Congress in the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969."'
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act" 6 sets
a different standard of compliance than the one
laid down in the Refuse Act. While under the
Refuse Act, all discharges made without a permit
11 See notes 34 and 35 supra.
1 362 U.S. 428 (1960).
"'42 U.S.C. §§ 4332 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
11633 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1970).
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constitute a criminal offense, the FWPCA states
that only discharges of certain substances above
specified levels are civil offenses, and are not subject to criminal presecution. The three programs
when considered together constitute a confusing,
contradictory, and seldom effective scheme for
regulating water pollution.
To eliminate the confusion produced by the
existing series of legislative enactments dealing
with water pollution and to insure non-degradation
of the waterways, a comprehensive re-expression
of Congressional intent is necessary--one that
has as its aim the eventual elimination of all discharges. Congress must establish a readily enforcible enforcement procedure with meaningful
deterrent levels. This procedure might provide
civil penalties for negligent and minor offenses
with criminal sanctions like those of the Refuse
Act but with more stringent punishments reserved
for cases of willful and extreme violations. Such a
scheme would preserve the stigma of criminality
for blatant violations where culpability is greatest,
and establish more effective criminal deterrents.
117
The proposed Senate amendment to the FWPCA
has many of these attributes.
'

17

See note 105 supra.

RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
NONUNANIMOUS VERDICTS

In Johnson v., Louisiana, 92 S.Ct. 1620 (1972),
and Apodaca v. Oregon, 92 S.Ct. 1628 (1972), the
Supreme Court held that 9-3 and 10-2 verdicts,
respectively, are constitutionally sufficient to convict in state criminal trials. In Johnson, tried before the sixth amendment was applied to the
states,' the defendant claimed that less than
unanimous verdicts circumvented the due process
requirement of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.' Mr. Justice White, writing for a fivejustice majority, rejected the argument that nine
individual jurors could not vote conscientiously in
favor of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when
three of their colleagues are arguing for acquittal.
' The sixth amendment right to trial by jury was
made applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Duncan does not apply retroactively. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968).
2In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970), held
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects an accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.

He perceived no basis for concluding that the nine
Jurors voting for conviction disregarded the instruction pertaining to standard of proof. The
majority also held that three acquittal votes did
not demonstrate that guilt was not in fact proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized
that a "substantial majority" of the jury was
convinced, and there was no reason to equate lack
of unanimity with the existence of reasonable
doubt.
In Apodaca four justices agreed that the sixth
amendment applied in its entirety to the states,
but concluded that its guarantee of a jury trial
does not require unanimous verdicts. Justice
White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, noted that the
drafters of the Bill of Rights deleted from the
sixth amendment the express requirement of unanimity in criminal cases. Furthermore, the plurality felt that the historical purpose of the jury, to
interpose the common sense of laymen between
the accuser and the accused, did not compel unanimous verdicts.
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Mr. Justice Powell, although concurring in the been construed to afford only use immunity and
result, argued that historically the sixth amend- not derivative use immunity, as did the federal
ment right to jury trial has carried with it the and New Jersey acts. Furthermore, he argued
safeguard of unanimous verdicts in federal trials. that both the reasoning and the result in Murphy
However, he contended that the due process clause v. Waterfront Commission 7 compelled the concluof the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate sion that transactional immunity was not constiall the particulars of the sixth amendment right tutionally mandated.8
to a jury trial. Therefore, he concluded, the states
The Court emphasized that in a subsequent
are free, within certain bounds, to experiment prosecution the government must prove that its
with jury trial variations.
evidence is derived from a legitimate source wholly
. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan and Mar- independent of the compelled testimony.
shall dissented in both cases. Justice Douglas,
Justices Douglas and Marshall dissented in
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, pointed both cases; Justices Brennan and Rehnquist did
out that the Court long ago held that the verdict not take part in the consideration or decision of
in civil trials must be unanimous,' and argued that either case.
it is anomalous to allow a person to be stripped of
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
his liberty by a lesser standard. Justice Stewart,
also joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
In United States v. Doyle, 456 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir.
argued that a unanimous verdict was necessary
1972), the court of appeals upheld a warrantless
to minimize the potential effects of bigotry. Jussearch of a drug suspect's garage incident to his
tices Brennan and Marshall each filed dissents
warrantless arrest in the house. An informant of
in which the other joined. Justice Brennan noted
proven reliability had told federal agents that the
that unanimous verdicts assured that each juror
defendant had drugs stored in his garage and was
would be heard. Justice Marshall felt that the
preparing to leave town. With this information
decision cut the heart out of the right to trial by
justifying his immediate arrest, the agents entered
jury and the right to proof beyond reasonable
the house and found the defendant and a female
doubt.
companion locked in the bathroom, the toilet
flushing. The court determined that the crime of
TESTIMONIAL IMmuNrrY
illegal possession of drugs had been committed
In Kastigarv. UnitedStates, 92 S.Ct. 1653 (1972)) in the officers' presence, and that the search of
and Zicarelli v. New Jersey, 92 S.Ct. 1670 (1972), the garage was reasonable in order to prevent
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of further destruction of evidence.
the federal statute' and a state statute 5 conferring
The per curiam opinion does not mention Chimel
use and derivative use immunity, but not transac- v. California,which held that a warrantless search
tional immunity, on witnesses compelled to testify incident to an arrest should be limited to the aragainst themselves. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for restee's person and the area within his immediate
a 5-2 majority in both cases, stated that the-fifth control.9 Rather, the Fifth Circuit opinion seemamendment privilege is coextensive with immunity ingly adopts Mr. Justice White's dissent in Chimel.
from use of the compelled testimony in subsequent Justice White contended that if there is probable
proceedings and use of evidence derived from the cause for a search, an extensive search following
testimony, but does not require immunity from an arrest is reasonable, since the arrest is an exiprosecution for offenses to which the compelled gent circumstance justifying police action before
testimony relates.
evidence can be removed or destroyed. 10
In so holding, the Court disregarded language
7378 U.S. 52 (1964).
in Counselnan v. Hitchcock6 that the constitution
8In Murphy, witnesses were granted transactional
required absolute transactional immunity. Mr. immunity under the laws of New York and New Jersey,
Justice Powell noted that this language was dicta, but continued to refuse to testify on the ground that
since the statute then under consideration had their answers might tend to incriminate them under
federal law. The Court held that the fifth amendment
3The seventh amendment right to a trial by jury in privilege protects state witnesses against federal as well
civil cases has been held to require a unanimous verdict. as state law, and thus the compelled testimony and its
American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897). fruits may not be used by federal officials in a subsequent prosecution. 378 U.S. at 79.
' 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
9 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
:N.J. REv. STAT. § 52:9 M-17(a) (Supp. 1970).
'1Od. at 780 (dissenting opinion of Justice White).
142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892).

